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INTRODUCTION

The proper representation of a client in a divorce action involves
substantially more than effecting the severance of the marriage and
*Certified Public Accountant, Partner Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co.
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extraction of an optimum property settlement from the adversary
spouse. Various tax ramifications, if not judiciously incorporated in
the overall "divorce strategy," can seriously undermine an otherwise
well-conceived settlement agreement. While some tax problems only
appear applicable to the dissolution of larger community estates,
others are generally relevant to all divorces. Since most tax consequences incident to divorce are well-settled, the attorney should
always attempt to mitigate divorce's ultimate insult-the outstretched hand of the tax collector-through appropriate presettlement planning.
THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
Where extensive properties are involved, the fair market value and
tax basis of each asset should be ascertained prior to formulating a
division of the property. Personal financial statements to banks and
other lenders, income tax returns, insurance policies and other
appropriate documentation are helpful and should be obtained from
the parties. Particular attention should be given to interests in closely
held corporations and partnerships. When large estates are involved,
or where the parties cannot agree as to the nature and extent of
property, independent verification by a nonrelated third party, e.g., a
Certified Public Accountant should be considered. Only after compiling this information is the attorney able to maximize his client's
property settlement by minimizing adverse tax consequences.
Three types of settlements involving community property are
prevalent: (1) an equal division in kind (achieved by partitioning
interests in each asset between the spouses); (2) an equal division of
the total community achieved by allocating various assets to each
spouse based upon fair market value; and (3) an unequal division of
the community balanced by a transfer of one spouse's separate
property to recompense the other for the inequality. Although fairly
well-settled, the tax consequences characteristic of each type of
property division are quite diverse. The problem has been succinctly
posed:
... in determining whether there is a realization of gain or loss there
must be a defermination of whether one spouse transferred an interest in his or her property, or whether the spouses have merely
received what he or she previously owned. The determination can
only be made by an examination of the state property law which
what the respective interests are at the time of the didetermines
1
vorce.

1. Spjut, Income Tax Consequences of Equal Divisions of Community Property in California, 4 U. San Francisco L. Rev. 397, 398-9 (1969).
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In United States v. Davis2 the Supreme Court held that taxation
would be imposed if a property settlement, under appropriate state
law, resulted in an exchange of property for marital rights, rather
than an equal division of jointly owned property.
In New Mexico a wife has more than a mere marital expectancy in
the community property; her interest is vested in her.3 The prior
case law 4 and the present statutes' indicate that the husband's and
wife's interests are identical. This principle is further supported by
the law of other community property jurisdictions.6
A. Partitionof the Community
Partitioning of the community requires that each specific community asset be divided equally between the spouses as separate
property, or that the entire community be transmuted by the exspouses into tenancy in common. This method of property division is
considered nontaxable under several alternative theories. First, the
exchange may qualify for nonrecognition under one of two Internal
Revenue Code provisions. Section 1036(a) provides that "no gain or
loss shall be recognized if common stock in a corporation is exchanged solely for common stock in the same corporation, or if
preferred stock in a corporation is exchanged solely for preferred
stock in the same corporation." In reliance upon this section, the
Internal Revenue Service has ruled that the conversion of an identical
number of shares of common stock held separately by husband and
wife into community property constitutes a nontaxable exchange."
Similarly, the ruling should apply when the ownership is converted
from community to separate incident to a property settlement. The
"like kind exchange" code section may also in some instances permit
the conversion of trade or business property ownership without
taxability. 8
2. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
3. In re Stutzman's Estate, 57 N.M. 710, 262 P.2d 990 (1953); McDonald v. Senn, 53
N.M. 198, 204 P.2d 990 (1949); Dillard v. New Mexico State Tax Commission, 53 N.M. 12,
201 P.2d 345 (1949); Jenkins v. Huntsinger, 46 N.M. 168, 125 P.2d 327 (1942); In re
Miller's Estate, 44 N.M. 214, 100 P.2d 908 (1940); Baca v. Belen, 30 N.M. 541, 240 P. 803
(1925).
4. McDonald v. Sein, 53 N.M. 198, 204 P.2d 990 (1949); Dillard v. New Mexico State
Tax Comm'n, 53 N.M. 12, 201 P.2d 345 (1949).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4A-8 (Supp. 1973); Ch. 246, § 6, [1975] N.M. Laws.
6. Cal. Civ. Code § 5105 (West Supp. 1975) states: "The respective interests of the
husband and wife in community property during continuance of the marriage relation are
present, existing and equal interests."; Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930) (wife has
present vested interest in community property under Texas law).
7. Rev. Rul. 66-248, 1966-2 Cum. Bull. 303.
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1031(a) provides:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in trade
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When the property involved does not qualify for nonrecognition,
the settlement, nevertheless, can be considered a nontaxable division
of property. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that a
transfer of property between spouses in a settlement and agreement
is generally taxable unless it constitutes a mere division of property

by co-owners. 9 This ownership requirement is satisfied if the prop-

erty involved is equivalent to the estate of a married person in his
portion of the community property.' 0 The Tax Court has also consistently maintained this position: "[when]

. . . in exchange for a

vested undivided one-half interest in the whole, each party receives a
vested interest in the whole of one-half, obviously there would be no
resulting taxable gain ...."1 1

B. Equal Division Based Upon FairMarket Value
Generally, the partitioning of assets between the two spouses will
prove impractical for various reasons. Co-ownership of necessity requires and implies a continued spirit of mutual co-operation in
administering the property, which seldom manifests itself in divorce.
Some properties, particularly real estate, may prove difficult to partition equitably. Finally, one spouse may desire complete, unfettered
ownership of a certain asset, e.g., the residence or a closely held
business. Consequently, another method of property division must
often be employed, which ordinarily involves the allocation of assets
between the spouses so that each receives approximately one-half of
the total fair market value of the community.
Whenever the parties divide the community property equally, or at
least make an honest effort to divide it equally, the resulting settlement should not constitute a taxable transaction.' 2 In Clifford H.
Wren the Tax Court enunciated the characteristics of such an exchange:
or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or other property
held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates
of trust or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness
or interest) is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held either for
productive use in trade or business or for investment.
9. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
10. Richard E. Wiles, Jr., 60 T.C. 56 (1973), aff'd, Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 310 (1974); George F. Collins, Jr., 46 T.C. 461
(1966), aff'd, Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), rev'd on rehearing412 F.2d 211 (10th Ci. 1969).
11. C. C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908, 914 (1946), aff'd, Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706
(5th Cir. 1947). See also Royce L. Showalter, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 192 (1974), wherein
the Tax Court reaffirmed this view.
12. John H. Schacht, 47 T.C. 552 (1967); Clifford H. Wren, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 290
(1965); Osceola Heard Davenport, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 856 (1953); Ann Y. Oliver, 8 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 403 (1949).
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We have no doubt that in the instant case petitioner and his former
wife made every effort to divide their community property as nearly
equal as possible. Nowhere in the agreement do we find words
indicating that a "sale" or "purchase" was contemplated by the
parties. Nor do we find one party giving any particular consideration
in return for a particular piece of property. A reading of the entire
instrument shows clearly that the parties intended to and did in fact
divide their community property. Each community asset was
assigned a value. Said value was arrived at by the parties after intensive negotiations. Each party was represented by competent counsel.
After arriving at the value, the parties partitioned (sic) the assets so
that each received total assets of approximate equal value. We do not
feel an agreement of this nature was anything more than a division
of property whereby instead of each spouse owning a one-half undivided interest in the whole, each owned a 100 percent interest in
one-half of the property. The execution of the property settlement
agreement was not a taxable transaction.' 3
This principle has continued vitality, particularly in the Tenth
Circuit. In Collins v. Commissioner," the Supreme Court concluded
that, since Oklahoma Law establishes that property acquired during
marriage is similar to community property, the division of property
pursuant to a divorce constitutes a nontaxable division between
co-owners. In Collins, the husband had transferred highly appreciated
stock to his wife incident to a settlement agreement. Although some
of its precedential force may since have been eroded,' I Collins is
most indicative of the Tenth Circuit's position on community divisions. The Tax Court recently has approved the Tenth Circuit's
disposition toward property divisions in a case involving a Kansas
couple's divorce. 1 6
The nontaxation of equal divisions of community property based
upon fair market value was not achieved without significant taxpayer
struggle, as the Service litigated various cases for many years.' ' This
culminated in 1967 with the Service's reported issuance of instruc-

13. 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 293.
14. 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), rev'd
on rehearing,412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
15. Since Collins, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that "A wife does not have

joint ownership in jointly acquired property ... for if she did that would return this

jurisdiction to a community property state which was repealed by the legislature in 1949."
Sanditen v. Sanditen, 496 P.2d 365, 367 (Okla. 1972).
16. Richard E. Wiles, Jr., 60 T.C. 56 (1973), aff'd, Wiles v. Comm'r., 499 F.2d 255 (10th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied 95 S.Ct. 310 (1974).
17. See cases cited in note 12, supra.
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tions to its agents to treat these divisions as the sale or exchange of
capital assets.' 8
Despite the Service's singular lack of success in taxing equal divisions, the nontaxable status of equal divisions has been questioned
from time to time. An early prognostication which proved erroneous
indicated that a settlement which neither constituted a true partition
nor came within the ambit of the predecessors of sections 1031 (a) or
2 °
This view was based
1036,' 9 would ultimately prove taxable.
is not a partidivision
upon the apparent conclusion that an equal
of similar
exchange
an
tion, a dissolution of a partnership in kind, or
has
spouse
each
assets. Another commentator has suggested that "....
assets
property
exchanged interests in certain specific community
transferred for the interests of the other spouse in those assets re2
ceived. This is the cross sale theory." 1 Under this rationale, both
spouses would recognize gain based upon the difference between the
spouse's tax basis of assets transferred and the fair market value of
assets received.
The Service has yet officially to announce its position regarding
equal divisions. One tax service has indicated that "... . the Service
has abandoned its attempt to devise a set of rules for coping with this
problem. Instead, protection will be achieved by the spouses entering
into an agreement with the District Director relative to such community property partition provided that the overriding intent is to
2
divide the community property assets equally by value." 2 This
scheme has not been published, nor is it employed by the Albuquerque District Director.2 3
C. Unequal Divisions
In certain instances the equal division of the community based
upon value will prove impractical. This occurs frequently when
closely held business interests are involved. The spouses reject nonconjugal partnership, while the remaining community assets are
insufficient to balance the division. Consequently, one spouse will
use his or her separate property, funds, or credit to acquire the
18. Shop Talk, 26 Jour. of Taxation 317 (1967); Weiss, Dividing Community Property:
An Unsuspected Tax Trap Told, Metropolitan News (Los Angeles) April 14, 1967, at 1, col.

4.

19. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 sections 112(b)(1) and 112(b)(2), respectively,
involving likekind exchanges and exchanges of stock in the same corporation.
20. Taylor & Schwartz, Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agreements, 7 Tax L. Rev. 19,
56 (1951).
21. Spjut, supra note 1, at 408.
22. BNA Tax Management Mem. 71-23, Tidbit #2 (Nov. 15, 1971).
23. Interview with Manuel Galegos, Chief, Review Staff, Internal Revenue Service,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, August 28, 1974.
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other's community interest in the nondivisible asset. This particular
type of settlement will generally result ultimately in taxation to one
or both spouses.
Except for the earliest reported case, 2 those considering unequal
divisions of community property have found any resultant gain to be
taxable. 2 I One general characteristic is present in all of these cases:
the husband transferred non-community funds or property to the
wife, and acquired more than one-half of the community. In Johnson
v. United States, 2 6 the earliest non-Tax Court case, the parties
sought to divide the community equally in value upon divorce, and
the property settlement agreement accordingly expressed such a
division. In addition, however, the husband agreed to pay the wife's
income tax liability for two years. The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the
District Court, held that the transaction did not constitute a mere
division of property, but rather was a taxable exchange.
Although a question of tax basis was ultimately involved in Rouse
v. Commissioner,2" the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit indicated
that where the husband acquired the majority of the community
property, as well as a portion of the wife's separate property, by
issuing a promissory note, the transaction was taxable. In Long v.
Commissioner,2 8 the husband acquired two-thirds of the wife's community property through the procurement of insurance policies for
the wife's benefit. Consistent with its holding in Rouse, the Fifth
Circuit held that this arrangement amounted to a purchase and sale.
The wife in Maurene De Wolfe Brown2 9 sold her one-half interest in
an orange grove to the husband for a $150,000 promissory note. The
Tax Court, following Johnson and Rouse, found no division of community interests involved; rather a sale of a nondivisible asset was
consummated, with the wife recognizing gain.
The "substance over form" doctrine was introduced into this area
24. Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). Walz involved a husband's claimed loss on
stock transferred to his wife in a transaction where the husband acquired the bulk of the
community by issuing a promissory note to the wife. The Tax Court disallowed the loss
because the transaction was a nontaxable partition, rather than a sale or exchange.
25. Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949), reversing 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
614 (1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 818 (1949); Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th
Cir. 1947), affirming 6 T.C. 908 (1946); Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir.
1943), reversing 45 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Cal. 1941); Jean L. May, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 256
(1974); Royce L. Schowalter, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 192 (1974); Robert S. Howard, 32
T.C. 1284 (1959); Jessie Lee Edwards, 22 T.C. 65 (1954); Maurine De Wolfe Brown, 12
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 948 (1953).
26. 135 F.2d at 127.
27. 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
28. 159 F.2d at 707.
29. 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 952.

NEW MEXICO LA4W REVIEW

.240

3
by the Tax Court in Jessie Lee Edwards.

[Vol. 5

Although the agreement

was devoid of the customary language denoting a sale, the transaction, when examined as a whole, differed from a division or partition. The husband had acquired over 97% of the total value of the
community property in exchange for borrowed cash and a promissory note. In Robert S. Howard,3 the wife waived and disclaimed
any community property interest in exchange for substantial cash
and bonds. The Tax Court viewed this as a bargained-for transaction
resulting in the transfer of property rights for a consideration.
In two recent cases, the Tax Court has finally drawn together the
factors it considers determinative in adjudicating the tax conse3
2
quences of community property divisions. In Royce L. Showalter,
for example, the court found language in the decree calling for "a
fair and equitable division of the community property" not to be
determinative:
In making this determination we have initially examined the
degree of divorce. The decree enumerates the community property
of petitioner and Dr. Walker, including the accounts receivable and,
in language calling for a "fair and equitable division of the community property," it provides the items of property that each party
would receive. . . . We are not bound by the literal language used in
the decree of divorce describing the division of property. [citation
omitted] We look to the decree in its entirety in determining
whether for Federal income tax purposes there was a sale or mere
division of community property. ...
A note or cash given out of the separate property of one of the
spouses to the other as part of the division of property is indicative
that something more than a mere division of community property
has occurred. ...
Furthermore, an examination of the various property each party
to the divorce was to receive indicates that some element of bargain32
ing or negotiation took place before the decree was entered.

Moreover, in Jean L. May 3 3 the court noted that it was not significant that the transfer took place in accordance with a court degree
instead of a settlement agreement.
This thirty year succession of cases establishes the principle that
the spouse who receives less than one-half of the community with an
equalizing transfer of the other spouse's separate property has participated in a taxable event.
30.
31.
32.
33.

22 T.C. at 68-69.
32 T.C. at 1294.
33 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. at 194-95.
33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 258.
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One final warning must be given. The Ninth Circuit in Johnson3 4
held that the payment of the wife's income taxes for two years
rendered an otherwise equal property division taxable to the husband. The rationale for the court's decision is not clear, although it
appears to be based loosely on the concept that dealings in property
are taxable unless specifically excluded. Fortunately for taxpayers,
the Service has generally not pursued this approach in unequal divisions, but has been content to tax the spouse who transfers community property for separate property under a sale theory.
D. Computation of Gain or Loss in Unequal Divisions
Several possible methods of computing gain or loss resulting from
an unequal division of the community exist; only the two most
prevalent theories will be explored. The "cross sale" theory, discussed previously with regard to equal divisions, would tax the entire
transaction, i.e., each spouse has entered into a total exchange of
assets with the other. Consequently, the gain or loss to each would
be computed by comparing the total fair market value of the assets
received (including both community and separate) from the other
spouse with the basis of the assets transferred to the other spouse. It
would appear that, even under this theory, assets which are partitioned in kind should not be includible in the computation. This
method is exemplified in Appendix I-A. The cross sale method, however, is not to be recommended to the attorney in determining the
tax consequences of a settlement.'
The second approach, which may be termed the "incremental"
theory, taxes only the gain attributable to the increment of community property in excess of the spouse's one-half which is transferred to
the other spouse.' 6 This gain is equal to the difference between
one-half of the community basis of the property transferred and the
fair market value of the property received. Under this approach, the
division is nontaxable to the extent both parties receive equal
amounts of community property; the spouse "purchasing" community property frQm the other recognizes no gain. Appendix I-B
illustrates such a computation. The incremental theory has been successfuly employed in New Mexico divorces upon Internal Revenue
Service examination, but the universally accepted method of computation has not yet been adopted by the Service or the courts.
34. 135 F.2d at 130.
35. See supra note 21, and accompanying text.
36. See Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706, 707 (5th Cir. 1949), where the court
applied the theory in determining the basis of property subsequent to the division.
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TAX BASIS OF PROPERTIES AFTER DIVISION
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 contains many basis provisions 3 7 ; none, however, directly concern community property
divisions. From this stems a judicially developed approach to basis
allocation and its attendant criticisms from commentators. The
courts, however, have remained steadfast in their determinations,
thus providing guidelines upon which the attorney can rely.
The tax basis of the community assets should be ascertained prior
to formulating a property settlement. Not only should the attorney
be cognizant of the amount of taxable gain or loss (if any) that his
client will incur from the settlement, he should also be aware of the
tax basis of the assets his client will receive. Those properties which
carry a low basis will ultimately produce less depreciation and more
gain upon disposition. Thus, the attorney representing a high bracket
taxpayer should attempt to procure high-basis properties for his
client whenever possible.
A. Nontaxable Divisions
The Tax Court has held in various cases that the basis of the
community in a particular piece of property carries over to the
spouse who acquires the total interest in such property pursuant to a
nontaxable division.3" In Wren 3" and John H. Schacht,4" each
spouse received a portion of the shares of stock held by the community; the court merely assigned the cost per share of the community stock to each share subsequently held separately. These cases,
however, were based on the earlier Oliver4" decision, in which a
nontaxable division was effected by the distribution of various parcels of community property of approximately equal value to each
spouse. The husband acquired his wife's interest in a certain block of
closely held stock. Following the subsequent sale of such stock, the
Service asserted that the taxpayer's cost was only one-half of the
original acquisition cost to the community, which should also be his
basis after the division. The Tax Court rejected this contention: "The
effect of (t)his position applied to all property involved in the parti37. E.g., § 334 (basis of property received in corporate liquidation), § 362 (basis of
property received by corporations in certain tax free transactions), and § § 1011-1023
(basis rules of general application).
38. Ann Y. Oliver, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403 (1949); Clifford H. Wren, 24 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 290 (1965); John H. Schacht, 47 T.C. 552 (1967). See also Swanson v. Wiseman,
461-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9264 (W.D. Okla. 1961), a case involving jointly acquired property
during marriage.
39. 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 290 (1965).
40. 47 T.C. 552 (1967).
41. 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403 (1949).
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tion would be to reduce the basis of all of it by one-half and thereby,
prevent either party from ever recovering the cost to the community." 4 2 The Court was not presented with any other alternatives
to consider in Oliver; thus the die was cast for the subsequently
rendered Wren and Schacht decisions.
The "attached" basis concept first formulated by the Tax Court in
the Oliver decision has been assailed by various commentators for the
potential unequal basis that could be allocated to the spouses who
intended to effect an equitable, nontaxable property division. 4 3 One
alternative is Rosenfeld's "item" theory where: ".

.

. in a non-taxable

exchange, if the husband exchanged his one-half interest in Item A
for the wife's one-half interest in Item B, the basis for his one-half of
Item A would carry over to the one-half of Item B acquired from his
wife." 4 This approach, which has been adopted neither by the
courts nor other commentators, is also impractical since very seldom does the settlement evolve through the exchange of one
specific asset for another.
Most authorities opt for either the "aggregate" or "partnership"
theories in post-settlement basis determination. Although conceptually dissimilar, both approaches, as a practical matter, are similar in
the resultant allocation. The aggregate theory, espoused primarily by
Rosenfeld 4 ' and Taylor and Schwartz,4 views each spouse as having an interest in the community equal to one-half of the total aggregate value. Upon division, each spouse would receive a basis equal to
one-half of the total basis to the community.
The community has also been described as a "partnership," where
...

the relationship of the spouses ...

is substantially that of part-

ners in a commercial partnership, and the husband and wife are in all
respects equal partners. .

.. "

' From this, at least two commenta-

tors4 8 have concluded that a community dissolution should be
42. Id. at 430.
43. Brickner, Basis: Considerations in Planning a Nontaxable Division of Community
Property, 42 Taxes 560, 561 (1964); Taylor & Schwartz, supra note 20 at 55; Rosenfeld,
Drafting a Property Settlement Agreement Under the 1954 Code: Part I, 1956 So. Calif.
Tax Inst. 675, 704. For a contrary conclusion, see Brawerman, A PracticalApproach to Tax
Problems in Divorce and Property Settlement Agreements, 1960 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 753,
761.
44. Rosenfeld, supra note 43, at 705.
45. 1d. at 704.
46. Taylor & Schwartz, supra note 43, at 56.
47. Rompel v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 483, 487 (S.D. Tex. 1945), rev'd 326 U.S. 367
(1945). See also DeFuniak & Vaughn, Principles of Community Property, § 95 (1971), and
United States v. Stapf, 309 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion at 599), rev'd. 375
U.S. 118 (1963).
48. Brickner, supra note 43, at 563; Bushman, The Widow's Election, 103 Trusts and
Estates 592, 594 (1964).
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governed by the partnership sections of the Internal Revenue Code,
principally Section 732(b). 4 This section essentially provides for a
carryover of basis from the partners' interest to the assets received.
Under either approach, the basis apportioned to each spouse would
be allocated among the assets based upon either the original basis or
relative fair market values at the time of division.o Under either
method the spouses usually procure equal bases and fair market
values.
The "aggregate-partnership" theories cannot be reconciled with
the Oliver' 1 "attached basis" theory. Although the Oliver rationale
can produce basis distortion between the spouses,' 2 no court to date
has accepted the alternative theories. Until the courts or Service
provide additional guidelines in this area, the attorney must be cognizant of Oliver's application to his clients and plan accordingly.
Basis may or may not evolve as a settlement issue; in any event, the
parties should not attempt to "equalize" any disparity in basis either
by effecting an unequal division or by transferring separate property
and risk tax liability.
B. Taxable Divisions
Since a taxable division of the community is termed a sale rather
than an exchange, the purchaser (the spouse who acquires the majority of the community property) will have as his basis the acquisition
cost of the particular interest purchased.' ' According to the judicially formulated method of determination, the purchaser's basis in a
specific item of property will consist of one-half of the original cost
to the community plus the amount "paid" for the purchase of the
seller's one-half community interest.5 4 Thus, in addition to one-half
of the community basis, the seller would add an amount apportioned
by allocating purchase price (cash or separate property transferred
plus spouse's liabilities assumed) among the retained assets based on
respective fair market value.' s
It is not entirely clear what basis the seller (the spouse who ac49. "The basis of property (other than money) distributed by a partnership to a partner
in liquidation of the partner's interest shall be an amount equal to the adjusted basis of such
partner's interest in the partnership reduced by any money distributed in the same transaction."
50. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 732(c) (partnership dissolutions). Cf. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.334-1(c)(4)(viii) (1975), concerning certain corporate liquidations.
51. 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403 (1949).
52. See Appendix II-A for a comparison of basis determined under the two approaches.
53. Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949); Rouse v. Commissioner, 159
F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
54. See cases cited in note 53, supra.
55. Appendix I1-B exemplifies such an allocation.
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quires non-community property on the division) will have in properties retained or acquired. If the entire community interest is disposed
of for cash, no problem arises. If the entire community interest is
disposed of for separate non-cash property of the other spouse, presumably the basis in the acquired property would be its "cost" under
section 1012-the fair market value of the property transferred. A
third type of division involves the retention by the selling spouse of
some part of the community property. In this situation, the basis
could be determined under the cross sale or incremental approach.5 6
DIVISION OF INCOME AND TAXES FOR YEAR OF DIVORCE
Proper provision is infrequently made for the filing of tax returns,
allocation of income, and payment of taxes in the settlement agreement. While these items ordinarily are not substantial in relation to
the overall settlement, they can prove most irksome at tax return
filing time if previous arrangements have not been made. The spouses
should agree to furnish each other copies of prior tax returns, wage
and withholding statements, and all other records necessary for
preparation of current income tax returns. In some instances one
accountant might prepare both spouses' returns to ensure consistency and proper allocations of income, deductions, withholding,
and other items.
In addition to providing for the resolution of current taxes, the
attorney should review prior years' returns and records for all taxable
years which have not been closed by the statute of limitations. Not
only will these records provide information concerning the extent of
community assets and income for division purposes, but they will
also indicate the advisability of providing for prior years' tax deficiencies resulting from Internal Revenue Service examination. Furthermore, provision may be made for payment of taxes upon a
spouse's gain from the settlement.
A. Allocation of Income and Deductions
The Community Property Act of 1973 effectively classifies income from community assets and earnings to the date of entry of a
divorce decree as community property.' ' Consequently, even
though the spouses are living apart, community income to the date
of the decree must be divided evenly between them for purposes of
filing income tax returns.5 8 Prior to the entry of final decree, how56. The incremental approach is illustrated in Appendix II-C.
57. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4A-2 (Supp. 1973).
58. Charloette J. Kimes, 55 T.C. 774 (1971); William E. Grace, 10 T.C. 1 (1948),
acquiescence, 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 2. Cf Knodle v. Warren, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9261 (W.D.
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ever, the spouses may enter into a property settlement,' 9 which will
be given effect if just and equitable6" and fraud or undue influence

are absent. 6

Under these circumstances, the income from the prop-

erty subsequent to the settlement will be the separate property of
the spouse who received such property.6 2
Apparently New Mexico spouses may validly agree that subsequently earned income for personal services would be the respective
separate property of each.6 3 The attorney should consider carefully
such a provision in an agreement effectuated prior to the final decree
to protect a spouse from paying taxes on income never received. An
alternative solution would be the allocation of tax liability between

the spouses by agreement. 6 4
As community income and deductions are divided equally between the spouses, so also are income tax withholding and estimated
tax payments (to the extent the latter are not made from one
spouse's separate income or property). 6 Since only one Form W-2
will ordinarily be given to an employee, each spouse should attach a
schedule to the return indicating the total community income and
deductions and the division to be made between them. To the allocated amount is added the spouse's separate income and deductions
for the entire year. The spouse not receiving the W-2 should obtain
and file a reproduced, copy in lieu of the original, which will be filed
by the wage-earning spouse. Appendix III reflects a type of schedule
that could be utilized for this purpose.
B. Tax Return Filing Considerations
The determination of marital status is made at the close of the
taxable year (ordinarily December 31 st for individuals)6 ; an individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of
Wash. 1966) (In Washington, community is dissolved after separation; income of husband
thereafter is not taxed one-half to wife).
59. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-2-12 (Repl. 1962).
60. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 36 N.M. 335, 15 P.2d 229 (1932).
61. Curtis v. Curtis, 56 N.M. 695, 248 P.2d 683 (1952); Trigg v. Trigg, 37 N.M. 296, 22
P.2d 119 (1933).
62. See Beatrice Aronow, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1079 (1970) (after an oral agreement
transmuting property, gain on a stock sale was taxable to the husband, who took the stock
under the agreement).
63. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-2-6 (Repl. 1962). A similar California statute, Cal. Civ. Code
§ 5103 (West Supp. 1975), has been construed to permit such an arrangement. Van Every v.
Commissioner, 108 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 309 U.S. 689 (1940). The
Internal Revenue Service will give effect to the agreement if valid under state law. Rev. Rul.
73-390, 1973 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 39, at 7.
64. See notes 74-82 infra, and accompanying text.
65. Donald W. Smith, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 933 (1950); Gilmore v. United States, 290
F.2d 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
66. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 143(a)(1) and 153(1).
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separate maintenance is not considered married. 6 7 Mere separation
does not alter marital status for tax purposes. 6 8 A husband and wife
may elect to file a joint return for any years during which they are
considered married for tax purposes. 69 Consequently, when a divorce action extends beyond one taxable year, the attorney should
consider the advisability of having his client file a joint return with
the opposing spouse. In most cases, a joint return will result in a
lower tax to the spouses, since the rates for married persons filing
separately are higher than for joint filings. One caveat should be
borne in mind: Once a joint return has been filed, the spouses cannot
thereafter elect to file separate returns after the time for filing has
expired; however, when separate returns are filed, a joint return may
be filed later by the spouses, even though subsequently divorced,
within three years of the due date of the original return."0
Several other factors should be considered in the filing of returns
during the pendency of an action and subsequent thereto. Often it
becomes necessary to extend the time for filing a return when two
taxable years are involved in a divorce due to noncommunication
between the spouses or information-gathering difficulties. In these
circumstances, each spouse should separately apply for an extension
of time, since an extension of time for one spouse does not apply to
the other, even when community income is to be split. 7 ' The obtaining of separate extensions will protect both spouses, and will not
prevent a joint return from later being filed if it ultimately proves
desirable.
Section 1348 provides that a fifty percent maximum rate will be
applied to earned income (salaries, professional fees, commissions,
etc.). Generally, for married individuals, this method of tax computation is not available unles the community has in excess of $52,000 of
earned income for the taxable year. But married individuals who file
separately may not avail themselves of this section.7 2 Therefore, the
availability of this section when joint returns are filed should be a
factor in the return method selection process.
The potential utilization of income averaging also should not be
67. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 143(a)(2) and 153(2).
68. But see Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 143(b), which provides that a married individual
who files a separate return, provides over one-half the support for a child who resides with
the individual, and has not resided with the other spouse for the entire year will be considered unmarried for tax purposes. In this case, the unmarried, head of household rates
would apply, pursuant to Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2(c).
69. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013(a).
70. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013(b).
71. Rev. Rul. 72-364, 1972-2 Cum. Bull. 636.
72. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1348(c).
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overlooked by the spouses. Because of the limitations of section
1304(c)(3), a joint return is dictated for the spouses if income
averaging can be applied. In determining base period income for a
married individual filing separately, the amount of earned community income cannot be less than the amount taken into account if such
amount was not community income. Likewise, in determining taxable income for the current year, the amount of earned income
subject to income averaging cannot exceed the amount which would
be taken7 into account if such amount did not constitute community
income. 3
C. Allocation of Tax Liability
A husband and wife are jointly and severally liable for the tax
reflected on a joint return. 7 4 Thus, the entire tax liability, or subsequent deficiencies, may be assessed against the community or separate income of either spouse. This joint and several liability on a
joint return also extends to interest and civil penalties for fraud,
regardless of which spouse is a party to the fraud. 7 ' Furthermore,
penalties have been assessed against a wife who did not sign the
return, but could not prove she never intended the return to be
joint.7 6 The ultimate insult was supplied by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Mitchell,77 where a divorced spouse was held personally liable for federal income taxes on her one-half of the community income during marriage, notwithstanding the fact that the
parties filed no returns and her subsequent renunciation under
Louisiana law of her community rights.
To mitigate against seemingly inequitable tax collection, Congress
enacted the so-called "innocent spouse rule," whereby relief is provided for the non-offending spouse where the liability is attributable
to an omission from gross income and certain other conditions are
present: (1) an amount in excess of twenty-five percent of the gross
73. This limitation may be illustrated by the following example: The income of H and W
for the current year consists of $30,000 of community income from personal services$20,000 earned by H and $10,000 earned by W. On a separate return for the year, W would
report $15,000 (one-half of community income). In determining her averageable income for
the current year, W's income must be reduced by $5,000, the excess of the community
income from personal services reportable on her return ($15,000) over the amount of such
income from personal services which would have been reportable by her if such income did
not constitute community income ($10,000). If the same facts were applicable to a base
year, H's taxable income for such year would be $20,000, which is the amount he actually
earned for such year.
74. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013(d)(3).
75. Kathleen C. Vannaman, 54 T.C. 1011 (1970); Michael Pendola, 50 T.C. 509 (1968);
Kann et. al. v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 247 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied 347 U.S. 967.
76. Irving S. Federbush, 34 T.C. 740 (1960), aff'd 325 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1963).
77. 403 U.S. 190 (1971).
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income shown on the joint return has been omitted by one spouse;
(2) the innocent spouse shows that, in signing the return, he or she
had no knowledge of, and had no reason to know of, the omission;
and (3) it is inequitable to hold the innocent spouse liable for the
deficiency in tax, taking into consideration whether or not the innocent spouse significantly benefitted, directly or indirectly, from the
items omitted from gross income and all other facts and circumstances.7 The determination of the spouse to whom items of gross
income (other than gross income from property) are attributable is
made without regard to community property laws;7 9 e.g., income
earned by the husband and omitted from a joint return, is to be
attributed to the husband.
The Tax Court has so strictly construed this "relief" provision that
in many cases it may provide no relief whatsoever.8 0 In Mary Lou
Galliher8 1 the wife filed a separate Federal income tax return omitting community income attributable to the husband. She neither
knew of nor benefitted from the omitted income and met all conditions of section 6013(e), other than the filing of a joint return. The
Tax Court held the provision inapplicable since no joint return was
filed; in addition, the provision was held not to unconstitutionally
discriminate against taxpayers-in community property states. In summary, if the spouses file a joint return for the period pending final
adjudication, joint and several liability for taxes will apply. The conditions of the innocent spouse rule are strictly construed when joint
returns are filed. A separate return will provide an escape for only
one-half of a community deficiency which may arise, since the innocent spouse rule only applies where a joint return has been filed.
D. Proration of Income Tax Liability: Interim Joint Returns and
Year-of-Divorce Returns
Should the spouses decide to file a joint return for a year during
which the divorce action is pending, the settlement agreement should
specify the manner by which the tax liability will be allocated to the
parties, as well as the items of income and expense each spouse will
be assigned for purposes of determination of the allocation. Various
methods exist for allocating such liability.8 2 First, if little or no
78. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013(e).
79. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013(e)(2)(A).
80. Georgiana Spaulder, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 723 (1972) (rule does not apply to an
erroneous deduction); Robert L. McCoy, 57 T.C. 732 (1972) (ignorance of legal tax consequences not sufficient); Louis Most, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1062 (1972) (failure of wife to
testify creates inference testimony would have been unfavorable).
81. Mary Lou Galliher, 62 T.C. 760 (1974).
82. For a comprehensive discussion of tax allocation, see Brawerman, supra note 43, at
782.
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separate income is involved, the parties may desire to treat the tax
obligation as any other community liability. On the other hand, the
parties may desire to allocate the tax based upon his or her portion
of the income and expense; e.g., the parties may agree to allocate the
joint tax based upon the tax each would have paid on the basis of
separate return filings. Regardless of the specific method to be
utilized, an agreement before hand will prevent later disputes.
In addition to interim joint return tax allocation, consideration
must also be given to the separate income tax returns the parties will
file for the year which encompasses the degree-the finalization of
the tax community. Community income and deductions must be
allocated between the spouses until the date of a decree of divorce or
8
separation, or until a settlement agreement is entered into. " As a
practical matter, the agreement will normally become effective coincident with the decree or shortly thereafter. Thus, tax liability
must be a consideration in the overall settlement. In this regard, the
possibility of a taxable settlement cannot be discounted. Where one
spouse earns the majority of the community income and such income is not evenly divided between the spouses during the pendency
of the divorce, counsel for the other spouse should ascertain that his
client is not placed in the position of paying taxes on income not
received.
THE TAXATION OF ALIMONY
Although New Mexico courts in practice award alimony to a
spouse much less frequently than those in non-community property
states, it is essential that the divorce attorney have a basic understanding of the alimony rules. In as much as an alimony grant may be
cumulatively large over an extended period of time, the tax ramifications are a significant factor in any settlement. The parties can, to a
large degree, control the tax consequences: the payments generally
are deductible by the payor and taxable to the recipient. Labels do
not control in determining the nature of payments, however; specific
guidelines are set forth in the Internal Revenue Code which define
the characteristics of the "true" alimony payment.
The following discussion does not present an exhausive study of
the taxation of alimony, but is intended to acquaint practitioners
with the general rules. Those cases involving complex support payment transactions should be thoroughly researched prior to entering
into an agreement.
Payments are taxable to the recipient and deductible by the payor,
83. See notes 57-65 supra, and accompanying text.
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if they: (1) are periodic; (2) are made pursuant to court decree or
certain agreements between the spouses; and (3) are made as a result
of the marital or family relationships.8 4 Payments required by court
divorce or separation decree are considered as alimony if the payments are received after the decree and the parties are divorced or
legally separated pursuant to the decree.' I A retroactive decree
encompassing payments made previous to the decree will not render
them deductible or taxable as alimony.8 6
Temporary support payments during the pendency of a divorce
action are treated as alimony where: (1) the spouses are living apart;
(2) the payments are made pursuant to court decree requiring the
support of the recipient spouse; and (3) the spouses file separate
returns for the year in which such payments were made. 8 7 However,
payments made during the pendency of a divorce will be considered
alimony only to the extent they exceed the recipient's share of the
community income for the year in which received." 8 Payments during the pendency of an action for support of minor children are not
considered alimony.8 9
The spouses may agree to alimony payments pursuant to a written
separation agreement, where the spouses: (1)are living apart; (2) file
separate returns for the year in which made; and (3) payments are
made as a result of the marital or family relationship.9 0 Payments
pursuant to a written agreement between the spouses incident to
divorce or legal separation may be deemed alimony, even though the
agreement does not qualify as a "written separation agreement."'"
The agreement is not required to be incorporated in the court decree, 9 2 but counsel should nevertheless consider the advisability of
so doing. "Incident to" is not defined either by the Code or a regulation; it would appear that most agreements referred to in a decree
which otherwise meet the requirements will qualify whenever arranged.
Payments must be "periodic" to qualify as alimony. 9 3 The following types of arrangements will qualify as periodic payments:
84. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 71(a).
85. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 71(a)(1).
86. Daine v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 449 (2nd Cir. 1948); Van Vlaanderen v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 389 (3rd Cir. 1949).
87. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 71(a)(3).
88. Marjorie Hunt, 22 T.C. 228 (1954); Rev. Rul. 74-393, Int. Rev. Bull. 1974-33, 7.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (1960).
90. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 71(a)(2).
91. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 71(a)(1).
92. MacFadden v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 545 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
968; Bertha McKay Pease, 26 T.C. 749 (1956).
93. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 71(a).
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(1) A fixed amount per period for an indefinite time. Example:
The payment of $200 per month until such time as the recipient
spouse remarries.
(2) An indefinite amount for either a fixed or indefinite period.
Example: The payment of thirty percent of the payor's salary for
eight years.
(3) Installments of a predetermined lump sum amount, but only
if the payment period extends beyond ten years. Example: The payment of $14,400, at the rate of $100 per month for twelve years.
(4) Installments of a predetermined lump sum amount extending
ten years or less, but only if the payments are specifically made
subject to cessation upon the occurrence of one of several contingencies-death of either spouse, remarriage of the recipient, or change in
financial circumstances of either spouse. 9 4
Since alimony is taxable to the recipient and deductible by the
payor, counsel must be cognizant of his client's probable income tax
bracket subsequent to divorce in order to fully assess the actual
economic impact. In this regard, the attorney should consider the
advisability of engaging the client's accountant to assist in the determination of the optimum alimony level for settlement purposes.
Whether payments represent alimony or payment for a former
spouse's one-half interest in the community is determined by the
intent of the parties as evidenced by the facts and circumstances of
each case.9 I The labels affixed to the arrangement by the parties are
not determinative, and the court will make its own independent
analysis of the transaction.9 6 The courts have developed criteria in
ascertaining the intent of the parties:
(1) Payments which are contingent in nature (those which cease
recipient or death of either spouse) are inupon remarriage of9 the
7
alimony.
of
dicative
(2) Payments made to a spouse who has already received his or
her share of the community property are indicative of alimony. 9 8
(3) A fixed payment unrelated to the payor's income is indicative
of a property payment. 9 9
94. See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d) (1960).
95. Ann Hairston Ryker, 33 T.C. 924 (1960); Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149
(10th Cir. 1971); Robert I. Martin, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1219 (1972).
96. Ben C. Land, 61 T.C. 675 (1974); Grant R. Bishop, 55 T.C. 720 (1971).
97. Robert I. Martin, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1219 (1972); Campbell, Jr. v. Lake, 220
F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955).
98. McCombs v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968); Robert I. Martin, 31 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1219 (1972).
99. Bernatschke v. United States, 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Brown v. United States,
121 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
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(4) The existence of a total, fixed sum to be paid strongly indicates a property payment was intended.' 0
Thus, open-ended agreements-those which deliberately attempt
to distort the nature of payments-should be avoided by conscientious counsel. Rather than permitting the Internal Revenue Service
and the courts to determine the intent of the parties, the agreement
and the actual facts supporting it should clearly dispose of the issue.
For this purpose, counsel should consider utilizing the tax accountant's services to ascertain the payment composition which will benefit the client. In most cases, it is possible to arrive at a settlement
with the most favorable overall tax and economic consequences to
both parties.
THE CHILD SUPPORT RULES
A. The Nature of Child Support
New Mexico courts will generally award custody of minor children
to the wife and require that the husband pay a certain amount to the
wife for the children's support. Although the reverse situation could
prevail, the ensuing discussion is based upon the more prevalent
occurrence. The husband may also be required by the decree to provide health and accident insurance coverage and bear the costs of
special or higher education. When the parties are unable to agree on
the amount of child support, the court will set the amount, generally
based upon judicially formulated guidelines, based on the husband's
"net disposable income."
The Code specifically excludes from alimony that part of any payment which the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement fix, in
terms of an amount of money or of a part of the payment, as a sum
which is payable for the support of the minor children of the husband.1 0 1 Thus, periodic payments which aren't specifically designated for child support are wholly taxable to the wife and deductible
by the husband as alimony;'" 2 the court also will not infer the
amount for support based upon other clauses of the agreement.' 03
The courts have interpreted the "fixed" payment requirements of
§ 7 1(b) very narrowly. For example, parole evidence introduced by
attorneys and judges who had participated in a divorce action was
100. Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964); Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318
F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963).

101. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 71(b).

102. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961); Ethel Rose, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1429 (1966), aff'd Rose v. Commissioner 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9353 (2nd Cir. 1968).
103. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961); Rev. Rul. 70-557, 1970-2 Cum. Bull.

10.
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insufficient to rectify a silent decree. 04 The Tax Court has refused
to allow a decree which allocated a specific portion of a payment to
the wife as child support "for tax purposes only."' '0 On the other
hand, a supplemental agreement between the spouses, unknown to
the divorce court, which required the wife to use a specific portion
of her alimony for the support of the children was held effective to
fix child support.' 6
B. Claiming the Exemption
There has been much litigation determining which divorced parent

can properly claim a dependency exemption for a child. In most
situations, it could have been avoided by proper planning. Subject to
special exceptions, the parent who has custody"'7 of the child for
the larger portion of the calendar year will ordinarily be entitled to

the exemption, provided that one or both parents together provide
over one-half of the child's total support' 0 8 and the child was in the

custody of either parent for more than one-half of the calendar
year.' 1 9 Where the divorce or separation occurs during the taxable

year, the parent who has custody for the greater portion of the remainder of the taxable year will generally be entitled to the exemption.'

'

As in the case of any deduction for dependent children,

the normal requirements must be met.' '
Under two exceptions, the noncustodial parent may claim the
104. Harbin v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Tenn. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 943
(6th Cir. 1970).
105. Jean Talberth, 47 T.C. 326 (1966).
106. Eugene F. Emmons, 36 T.C. 728 (1961), aff'd, 311 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1963).
107. According to Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(b) (1975), custody is determined by the terms
of the most recent decree or agreement. Failing resolution with reference to these documents, physical custody for the greater portion of the year will control.
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(i) (1975) provides:
For purposes of determining whether or not an individual received, for a given
calendar year, over half of his support for the taxpayer, there shall be taken
into account the amount of support received from the taxpayer as compared
to the entire amount of support which the individual received from all sources,
including support which the individual himself supplied. The term "support"
includes food, shelter, clothing, medical and dental care, education, and the
like. Generally, the amount of an item of support will be the amount of
expense incurred by the one furnishing such item. If the item of support
furnished an individual is in the form of property or lodging, it will be necessary to measure the amount of such item of support in terms of its fair market
value.
109. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 152(e)(1).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(c) (1975).
111. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 15 l(e)(1)(B) provides an annual exemption of $750 for
each dependent who is a child of the taxpayer and who (1) has not attained the age of 19 at
the close of the taxpayer's taxable year, or (2) is a full-time student for at least 5 calendar
months of the taxpayer's taxable year.
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dependency exemption. First, a noncustodial parent who provides at
least $600 annually for support of a child and the divorce or separation decree, or a written agreement between the parents, specifically
assigns the deduction to the payor, will be entitled to the dependency exemption.' 2 The noncustodial parent must provide at
least $600 for the support of each child claimed as a dependent. An
oral agreement between the parents will not satisfy the requirements
of section 152(e)(2)(A)(i), which requires a written agreement;' ' 3
however, a written agreement, executed after the taxable year in
which child support payments were made by the noncustodial parent
but within the statutory period for filing a refund claim, will meet
the requirements.' '4 Finally, even though the earnings of a noncustodial parent who has remarried may be considered as community
income, such parent will nevertheless be attributed with the entire
amount of support for purposes of the $600 test.' '
The second exception to the primary custody rule specifies that
the noncustodial parent will be entitled to the dependency exemption if he provides $1200 or more annual child support (irrespective of the number of children), and the parent having primary
custody does not clearly establish that he provided a greater amount
of support.' 16 "Clearly establish" only requires that a "clear
preponderance" of the evidence be shown on the part of the custodial parent.' ' This exception should not be relied upon by
counsel in planning, since it unfortunately has spawned much recent
litigation involving which spouse provided the most support, even
where the noncustodial parent has paid in excess of $1200
annually.' 1 8 The noncustodial parent also incurs a substantial risk of
losing the dependency exemption upon the custodial parent's remarriage, since the Service has ruled that in applying section
152(e)(2)(B) to determine which parent provided the most child
support, the remarried custodial parent may claim the child support
provided by the new spouse.' ' 9 Furthermore, the noncustodial
parent may not treat arrearages in child support paid in one year in
excess of current obligations for that year as child support payments
112. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 152(e)(2)(A).
113. Vernon L. Sheeley, 59 T.C. 531 (1973).
114. Rev. Rul. 70-73, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 29.
115. Martin Colton, 56 T.C. 471 (1971).
116. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 152(e)(2)(B).
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(d)(3) (1975); Allen F. Labay, 55 T.C. 6 (1970), aff'd per
curiam, 450 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1971).
118. See, e.g., Herbert Wieder, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1067 (1971); Richard Keith
Johnson, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 941 (1972); Neta L. Sharney, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 460
(1972); William G. Wohner, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1166 (1972).
119. Rev. Rul. 73-175, 1973-1 Cum. Bull. 58.
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for such year for purposes of determining which divorced parent paid
over one-half of the support.'

20

The aforementioned exceptions apply only if the child receives
over one-half of his support for the year from both parents together.' 21 Thus, if the custodial parent's new spouse provides over
one-half of the support, the noncustodial parent may not claim the
dependency exemption, even if such exemption had been granted to
him pursuant to the decree or written agreement. Correspondingly, a
noncustodial parent who provides at least $1200 child support
annually will be entitled to the dependency exemption, notwithstanding a contrary provision in the decree awarding the exemption
to the custodial parent, who cannot prove he provided the greater
portion of the support.' 22 These possibilities render tax planning
less certain; provision in the degree or agreement between the parties,
however, for child support and the corresponding dependency exemption is nevertheless preferable to omission.
C. Some Planning Considerations
Even though complete control of the child support dependency
deduction is elusive, counsel should attempt to effectuate for his
client the most advantageous agreement possible. It is quite likely
that both parties will benefit economically from tax dollars saved, if
several rules and procedures are observed, the thrust of which is taxing income in low income tax brackets and claiming deductions in
high brackets. Since child support is neither deductible by the payor
nor taxable to the recipient, while the opposite is true for alimony,
the parties should strive for a balance which will provide the recipient and payor with the most after-tax dollars.
Two other tax-reducing factors, custody and dependency, are tied
to child support. First, the custodial parent may qualify for the headof-household income tax rate, even though the noncustodial parent is
awarded the dependency exemption by decree or agreement. To
qualify, however, the one claiming such status must provide over
one-half the cost of maintaining the home during the taxable
year.' 23 Second, the parent who is awarded the dependency exemp120. Bobby R. Casey, 60 T.C. 68 (1973).
121. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 152(e)(1)(A).
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(d)(3) (1975).
123. Pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(d) (1971), the expenses of maintaining a household
include property taxes, mortgage interest, rent, utility charges, upkeep and repairs, property
insurance and food consumed on the premises. Such expenses do not include the cost of
clothing, education, medical treatment, vacations, life insurance, and transportation.
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tion will also be permitted to deduct medical expenses paid on the
child's behalf, which are within the prescribed limits.' 24
Finally, consideration should be given to altering the amount of
child support whenever the parent who was originally awarded the
exemption loses it. Thus, whenever the noncustodial parent loses the
exemption because of support provided by the custodial parent's
new spouse, the obligation could be correspondingly decreased. Likewise, the custodial parent who loses the deduction due to the unanticipated payment of $1200 annually by the noncustodial parent
could be protected either by an increase in alimony or mandatory
child support.
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
In the typical community estate, life insurance policies play a
major role. Consequently, appropriate arrangements for the disposition of policies should be made by the parties. Although the taxation
of life insurance policies, premiums and proceeds is somewhat complex, and not entirely settled in a divorce context, certain conclusions can be drawn regarding preferable methods of disposition.
Insurance policies on the spouses' lives acquired subsequent to
marriage are community property if the premiums are paid from
community funds.'2 s Policies acquired prior to marriage, however,
are the separate property of the insured,' 26 even where subsequent
premiums are paid from community funds.' 2 7 It is essential that
counsel ascertain the nature, extent and ownership of policies, the
cash surrender value and the premiums paid, if possible, prior to
formulating the property settlement.
In a taxable division involving life insurance policies the transfer of
ownership will very likely result in the recognition of gain to the
transferor, to the extent the cash surrender value exceeds the
premiums paid up to such time.' 218 For example, in a taxable division the assignment of a community-owned policy on the husband's
life to the husband would result in a gain to the wife equal to onehalf of the difference between cash value and premiums paid. An
estate planning practice in vogue is the separate ownership of policies
on one spouse by the other, the result of which is that all such gain is
taxable to the transferor spouse.
124. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(a)(1).
125. Hickson v. Herrmann, 77 N.M. 683, 427 P.2d 36 (1967); In re Miller's Estate, 44
N.M. 214, 100 P.2d 908 (1940);In re White's Estate, 43 N.M. 202, 89 P.2d 36 (1939).
126. See cases cited in note 125, supra.
127. See J. Wood, The Community Property Law of New Mexico 66-67 (1954).
128. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 72(e)(1)(B).
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Presumably, the resultant gain will be ordinary rather than capital.1 2 Any loss resulting from the transaction will be nondeductible, either on the basis of a transaction between related parties,' 30
or on the theory that the difference is the cost of insurance.' 3 1 The
transferee of the policies, having in effect "purchased" the transferor's interest, would acquire a basis32 in the transferor's interest
equal to the then cash surrender value.'
If the overall property division is 3 nontaxable, no gain or loss
1
Seemingly, this result could
should be recognized to the spouses.'
involved, since the transfer
are
only occur when community policies
taxable. The basis of the
be
of separately owned policies would
policy would equal the amount of premiums paid by the community
in a nontaxable division.
Under most circumstances, the proceeds received under a life
insurance policy at the insured's death are not taxable to the beneWhere the policy has been assigned for a "valuficiary thereof.'
able consideration," however, the proceeds received in excess of the
transferee's basis (premiums and consideration paid) are taxable as
ordinary income.' 3 1 Consequently, the proceeds received by an extransferred
spouse at the death of the other from a policy which wastaxation.'
3 6
income
to
subject
be
will
incident to a taxable division
On the other hand, the proceeds received by the beneficiary from a
policy which was transferred in a nontaxable division will not be insince the basis in the policy
cluded in the beneficiary's gross income,
13 7
transferee.
would carry over to the
Inasmuch as the parties will normally desire to acquire sole ownership of policies on their respective lives, counsel must strive to effectuate this at minimum tax cost. The most prudent course of action
dictates that each policy be assigned to insured, which will obviate
any adverse taxation of proceeds at death. 38 In most situations,
129. Theodore H. Cohen, 39 T.C. 1055 (1963), acquiescence, 1964-1 Cum. Bull. 4;
Abram Nesbitt 2d, 43 T.C. 629 (1965); Roff v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 450 (3rd Cir.
1962).
130. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 267(a)(1).
131. Keystone Consolidated Publishing Co., 26 B.T.A. 1210 (1932); London Shoe Co. v.
Commissioner, 80 F.2d 230 (2nd Cir. 1935), cert. denied 298 U.S. 663 (1936); Century
Wood Preserving Co. v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1934).
132. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 72(g)(1).
133. See Brawerman, supra note 43, at 773; Bell, infra note 156, at 59.
134. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(a)(1).
135. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(a)(2).
136. Although certain transfers for value are expected by § 101(a)(2)(B), the transfer to
a spouse or former spouse is not. See Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(5), ex. 6 (1975).
137. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(a)(2)(A) specifically exempts from the transfer for
value rule those policies which carry a substituted basis.
138. Pursuant to Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(a)(2)(B), the transfer of a policy to the
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any taxable gain stemming from the transfer at the time of the division should be minimal, since the cash surrender value will not
greatly exceed the premiums paid unless the policies are quite large
or fairly old. In any event, the parties should arrange the settlement
so that taxation of proceeds at death is eliminated or minimized.
In some instances, a spouse may be required to pay premiums on
policies for the benefit of the other spouse or the children. Premiums
paid by one spouse on a life insurance policy assigned to the former
spouse who is also designated the irrevocable beneficiary are treated
as alimony, assuming the other prerequisites for alimony are met.' ' 9
If, however, the insured can borrow against the policies, no absolute
divestiture has occurred.' 4 0 Premium payments on those policies
which are not assigned, or under which a spouse is merely a contingent beneficiary are not alimony.'
Premiums on policies which are
merely security for alimony are not treated as alimony.1 4 2 Finally,
premiums on term insurance may not qualify under any circumstances, since no immediate economic benefit is bestowed.' '
A spouse sometimes is required to secure child support payments
with insurance policies (either in trust or outright) or designate
children as irrevocable beneficiaries. Such payments aren't deductible
by the payor, nor do they qualify as child support for dependency
determination purposes.' '4 In addition, since the custodial spouse
recognizes some indirect benefit from the security, perhaps counsel
can utilize this as a bargaining point on behalf of the payor.
PROFESSIONAL FEES IN MARITAL SETTLEMENTS
Generally, fees and other costs paid in connection with a divorce
are not deductible by either spouse, since they are considered as
originating from a transaction which is personal in nature.' " ' That
portion of the fees, however, which can be allocated to advice concerning the tax consequences incident to divorce is deductible under
section 212(3).'46 Where the taxpayer is unable to establish any
insured is excluded from the transfer for value rule. This would apply even in a taxable
division.
139. Rev. Rul. 70-218, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 19; Stevens v. Commissioner, 439.2d 69 (2nd
Cir. 1971).
140. Harold Ostrov, 53 T.C. 361 (1969).
141. Rev. Rul. 57-125, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 27; James Parks Bradley, 30 T.C. 701 (1958).
142. Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, 14 T.C. 1356 (1950), acquiescence 1950-2 Cum.
Bull. 1; Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2nd Cir. 1953).
143. William H. Brodersen, Jr., 57 T.C. 412 (1971).
144. Frank C. Brandes, Jr., 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1436, 1440 (1970).
145. Gilmore v. United States, 290 F.2d 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961); United States v. Patrick, 372
U.S. 53 (1963); Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7) (1975).
146. Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 Cum. Bull. 179; George v. United States, 434 F.2d 1336
(Ct. Cl. 1971).
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basis for allocation, the courts apparently will apply the "Cohan"
rule (estimation of deductible amounts when records are inadequate)
to determine the proper deduction.' '
In addition to fees for tax advice, a taxpayer may capitalize the
1
portion of the fee pertaining to the acquisition of capital assets. 48
In this situation, the applicable portion would be allocated pro rata,
as of the time of the divorce, to the cost basis of the properties
which the taxpayer received in the division of the community
estate." 9 The remainder of the fee not allocated to tax advice or
property acquisition (such as child custody, attendance at trial,
document drafting, etc.) would not be deductible nor capitalized.
Fees allocable to the procurement of alimony are deductible to
the spouse who obtains it,1 " under section 212(l), pertaining to
expenses for the production of income. Fees paid by a spouse to
resist alimony claims, however, are not considered deductible.' "
A spouse can claim no deduction for fees paid on behalf of the
other spouse, whether paid pursuant to decree or for the spouse's tax
advice,' s' since the services were not rendered to the payor in connection with tax determination or income collection. The other
spouse very likely cannot claim a deduction, since the expenses were
paid by another party. In the situation where this has occurred, however, counsel could claim' a deduction based upon the doctrine of
''constructive payment."'
The parties could attempt to obtain a
tax deduction by requiring each to pay his own fees, with an increased settlement amount, less tax benefit, being paid in lieu of payment of fees on behalf of a spouse.
The delicate nature of the income tax deduction for professional
fees requires that careful consideration be given to time-keeping and
147. Sidney Merians, 60 T.C. 187 (1973), acquiescence, I.R.B. 1973-42, 6; George v.
United States, 434 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
148. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); Gilmore v. United States, 245 F.
Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
149. George v. United States, 434 F.2d 1336 (Ct. CI. 1971).
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7) (1975); Ruth K. Wild, 42 T.C. 706 (1964), acquiescence, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 4; Hazel Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448 (1966), aff'd per
curiam on othergrounds, 388 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1968).
151. I.T. 3856, 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 23. Although declared obsolete (Rev. Rul. 69-43,
1969-1 Cum. Bull. 310), this position would be supported by Gilmore v. United States, 290
F.2d 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
152. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646
(8th Cir. 1952).
153. In Rev. Rul. 73-13, 1973-1 Cum. Bull. 42, the Service ruled that tax counseling fees
paid by a corporation on behalf of an employee are includable in gross income and are
deductible under section 212. To the extent that fees are for tax advice, the non-paying
spouse could rely on this ruling for deduction, although the overall chances of success
appear doubtful.
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statement preparation. This must be done as the case develops; an
analysis performed during the Internal Revenue Service audit will be
accorded little weight by the Service and the courts.' I The statement rendered the client should specifically allocate the portion of
the fee allocable to tax advice, property conservation and acquisition, and other services which are nondeductible. These allocations
can be based upon time required, complexity and magnitude of the
tax issues involved, local customary fees for such services, and the
results obtained for the client.' ' ' Rather than making an unreasonable allocation and risk losing the entire deduction, the attorney
should strive to render billings which are supportable and will
maximize the chances for deduction.
OTHER SPECIAL INCOME TAX PROBLEMS
A. Recognition of Loss on Taxable PropertyDivision
Absent precedent, commentators predicted the non-deductibility
of losses from taxable divisions.' s 6 This conclusion was predicated
upon several assumptions: (1) A loss from a transaction between
related parties (herein husband and wife) is not allowed as a deduction;' '7 (2) the transaction is not business-motivated, but arises
from personal considerations;1 '
and (3) a loss is not deductible
unless incurred in a trade or business, or from a transaction entered
into for profit.' 59
The Tax Court in William E. Robertson, however, has upstaged the
commentators in a tersely written opinion by holding that a loss
sustained by a taxpayer from the sale of a motel to his former wife
incident to a divorce proceeding was deductible under section
165.1 6 0 Curiously, although the Service based the loss disallowance
in the deficiency notice partially upon section 267, this rationale was
154. See George v. United States, 434 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1971), wherein the Court of
Claims (generally considered to be the most liberal in allowing deductions for fees) gave no
weight to an attorney's time and fee allocations.
155. Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 Cum. Bull. 179.
156. See, e.g., Bell, Community Property,Divorce, and Tax Planning, 11 Tax Counselor's
Quarterly 49, 56 (1967); Taylor & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 58; Wegher, Estate Planning
Considerations in Divorce and Separation, 3 Institute on Estate Planning
69.1100,
69.1108 (1969).
157. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 267(a).
158. Gilmore v. United States, 290 F.2d 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (the test for deductibility is
the origin and nature of the transaction from which the loss arose); David R. Pulliam, 39
T.C. 883 (1963), aff'd, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cit. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (loss from
disposition of residence in property settlement nondeductible).
159. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165(c).
160. 55 T.C. 862 (1971). The Service did not appeal this case, but has acquiesced in the
decision at 1972-2 Cum. Bull. 3.
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specifically disclaimed at trial; presumably, the Service felt that
either it had the stronger case under section 165 or that section 267
would be inapplicable since the actual property transfer occurred
subsequent to the marriage dissolution.
No cases subsequent to Robertson have been litigated, but the
Service's acquiescense should support a deduction. Thus, if a loss
results from a taxable division of the community, it may be claimed
on the party's income tax return. The creation of such losses, however, should be avoided in arranging property settlements until the
matter is litigated further. In any event, the actual property transfer
should be timed to occur subsequent to the marriage dissolution.
B. Recognition of Gain: Ordinary or Capital?
In planning the property settlement, counsel should consider
whether resulting gain or loss will be capital or ordinary. For
example, gain recognized from a sale or exchange between husband
and wife from depreciable property is ordinary in nature.1 6
Although this provision was enacted primarily to prevent spouses
from obtaining an increased basis to permit more depreciation (an
ordinary deduction) from a sale between themselves reportable as
capital gain, the statute is silent as to requisite motives underlying a
transaction. Consequently, if spouses made such a transfer in a taxable division prior to actual dissolution of the marriage, section 1239
could apply to the unwary party who recognizes gain. This pitfall
might be avoided either by delaying the transfer until after the divorce is final, or by structuring the division so that property with
section 1239 potential is made a part of the nontaxable division (section 1239 only applies to recognized gain).
In a taxable property division, other Code sections will operate to
render taxable gain ordinary in nature. These primarily relate to "recapture" of ordinary deductions previously claimed by a taxpayer.
The prevalent recapture sections pertain to certain depreciable personal' 6 2 and real 1 6 3 property, certain previously claimed farm
losses,' 64 and soil and water conservation and land clearing expenditures.' 6- In a taxable exchange resulting from a division of community property, the sales price for purposes of determining recap16
ture is presumed to be the fair market value of the property. 6
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1239(a)(1).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1245.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1250.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1251.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1252.
See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 1245(a)(1)(B)(ii) and 1250(a)(1)(B)(ii).
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These recapture rules will apply whether the division is consummated
preceding or subsequent to the marriage dissolution.
Certain tax-free transactions are excluded from the recapture provisions: reorganizations, certain subsidiary liquidations, transfers to
corporations and partnerships, gifts, bequests, like kind exchanges,
and involuntary conversions where replacement property is obtained.! 6 7 These are specifically enumerated by the operative sections, which also provide "such gain shall be recognized notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle." ' 6 8 This language has
been construed as requiring that recapture be recognized upon any
other type of disposition.' 6 9 Thus, the nontaxable community division would appear to be taxable to the extent that the recapture provisions are applicable to the property involved. An exception should
be made for partitions in kind, however, since no disposition is involved.
C Tax Acceleration Items
Generally, when property for which investment credit has been
claimed is disposed of prior to the end of the term of years used in
computing the amount of credit, the portion of the credit is recaptured,' 70 unless a mere change in the form of conducting business or
one of several nontaxable transactions is involved.' 7 1 The division of
community property is not among the enumerated transactions.
Consequently, unless a partition is involved,' 72 recapture of investment credit would apply to property divisions, whether taxable or
not.
Another potential tax acceleration item involves installment obligations. When certain conditions are satisfied, sales of property giving rise to taxable gain may be reported over the contractual period
when the purchaser makes payments in installments.' "3When the
seller-obligation holder sells or otherwise disposes of the obligation,
however, the unrecognized gain is accelerated into the taxable year
during which the disposition is made.' 71 Certain exceptions are
167. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 1245(b) and 1250(b).
168. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 1245(a) and 1250(a).
169. Franklin Clayton, Transferee, 52 T.C. 911 (1969).
170. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 47(a)(1).
171. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 47(b).
172. Frank R. Hammerstrom, 60 T.C. 167 (1973), acquiescence, 1973-2 Cum. Bull. 2.
The transmutation of community property into equal tenancy in common does not trigger
investment credit recapture under section 47(a)(1), since no disposition has been made.
Even if a disposition is found, it represents a mere change in form of ownership under
section 47(b).
173. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 453(a) and (b).
174. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 453(d)(1).
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made for death and other tax-free transactions, 1 ' I among which a
property division is not included. Although an argument could be
made for excluding in-kind divisions based upon the investment
credit rationale, no authority exists for doing so. 1 '76
Counsel should always ascertain the nature and extent of tax
acceleration items prior to negotiating a property settlement.
Whenever possible, assets with acceleration potential should be partitioned equally between the parties. If this is not attainable, then the
increased tax burden upon the party disposing of the particular asset
should be reflected in the overall settlement.
D. Accounts Receivable
The accounts receivable of an .individual cash basis taxpayer'77
present another problem area to counsel. Ordinarily, professionals
(physicians, architects, attorneys, accountants, etc.) and other individuals primarily involved in service enterprises with little or no inventory will utilize the cash method of accounting because of its simplicity and income deferral potential. The disposition of receivables
prior to collection will ordinarily result in the recognition of
ordinary income at the time of sale or collection,'7 even if the
owner practices through a partnership 1 '79 rather than as a sole
proprietor.
In a taxable property division whereby one spouse obtains all such
receivables, the transferor will be deemed to have sold his or her onehalf community interest and thus realizes ordinary income to the
extent of the "sales price" or fair market value at the time of
division, whichever is applicable.' 80 The transferee will obtain a
stepped-up basis in the purchased one-half of the receivables.' 8 1 If
the division is nontaxable, however, the transferor, who has neverthe175. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 453(d)(3) and (4).
176. In Swaim v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969), a Kentucky husband
received taxable income upon the assignment of an installment obligation to his former wife
as alimony pursuant to the divorce decree, since such transfer was a disposition under
section 453(d). The rationale of this case apparently would apply to property divisions as
well.
177. A cash basis taxpayer is one who recognizes income for tax purposes when cash or
its equivalent is received; an accrual basis taxpayer, on the other hand, recognizes income at
the time the transaction is billed to the customer.
178. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940). This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the "anticipatory assignment of
income" doctrine.
179. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 751(c)(2).
180. Royce L. Showalter, 33 CCH TAx Ct. Mem. 192 (1974). See also Helvering v.
Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937), involving a disposition of partnership receivables.
181. See note 53 supra, and accompanying text.
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less made an anticipatory assignment of
income, would be taxed in
1
the year the recipient makes collection. 82
When uncollected, unreported receivables are involved, the tax
consequences must be recognized and provisions made. While dividing the proceeds equally upon receipt may prove the most equitable
economically and taxwise, it probably is the most unacceptable,
since the parties would be required to deal with each other subsequent to the divorce. This problem could be alleviated somewhat by
escrowing the accounts at a financial institution for collection and
disbursement. Alternatively, the spouse whose business produced the
accounts may desire to retain all of them for appropriate business
reasons. In this case, provision should be made to adequately compensate the other spouse for the unfavorable tax consequences.
E. Retirement Plans: Qualified and Nonqualified
The New Mexico Supreme Court has determined that a vested
interest in a qualified retirement plan is community property.' 83
Certain Federal plans may be treated differently, however, due to
spendthrift clauses prohibiting assignment of benefits.' 84 A lengthy
dissertation of the property status of such income is beyond the
scope of this article;1 8 s it will be assumed in the ensuing discussion
that community property is involved.
Vested interests in pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus or other
retirement plans (whether private or governmental) may be analogous to accounts receivable, since a previously untaxed asset
generally giving rise to ordinary income upon receipt is involved. If
the proceeds of the plan are set aside to one spouse in a taxable division, the other may be deemed to have sold the community interest
in the plan and realized ordinary income equal to one-half of the
present value of the plan at the time of the division.' 86 Employee
182. Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943); Helving v. Eubank, 311
U.S. 122 (1940).
183. LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969); Otto v. Otto, 80 N.M. 331,
455 P.2d 642 (1969). (These decisions apply to that portion of retirement pay earned in a
community property state.)
184. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 363 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). On the other hand,
the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that Civil Service annuity income (Rev. Rul. 63-168,
1963-2 Cum. Bull. 9), Armed Forces retirement pay (Rev. Rul. 63-169, 1963-2 Cum. Bull.
14), and Social Security benefits (Rev. Rul. 63-167, 1963-2 Cum. Bull. 17) are community
income for purposes of computing the retirement income credit.
185. See Hughes, Community-Property Aspects of Profit-Sharingand Pension Plans in
Texas-Recent Developments and Proposed Guidelines for the Future, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 860
(1966), and Johnson, Retirement Benefits as Community Property in Divorce Cases, 15
Baylor L. Rev. 284 (1963).
186. Rev. Rul. 69-471, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 10.
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contributions deemed to be community property which are attributable to the transferor spouse are not generally taxable upon receipt
and would be deductible from the gross settlement.'87
If the non-employee spouse receives benefits only to the extent
and at the time that the named recipient does, the proceeds should
be taxed identically to both spouses, since a partition, rather than a
division, has been made.' 88 A nontaxable division should result in
the application of the income assignment principle; the transferee
would be taxable in the year the employee spouse actually receives
the benefits.
Under normal circumstances, the taxation of section 401 qualified
retirement and deferred compensation plans is most complex. When
these are involved in property settlements, the tax consequences and
other attendant problems may appear staggering. For example,
valuing a vested interest may require the services of a qualified
actuary. Third party contracts are involved, which may stringently
restrict assignment or withdrawal of funds. Employers may be unwilling to cooperate with nonemployee spouses. Consequently, the
attorney should consult a competent tax accountant to assist in
determining the most acceptable solution to the problem.
A contractual right to receive deferred compensation upon retirement, based upon a non-qualified plan, would appear to be treated
the same as a vested interest in a qualified plan, where such payments
are for previous services rendered.'89 A problem, however,
presented by the interests which are contingent, forfeitable or nonvested; the nature of an interest is determined at the time of acquisition which in this case would be vesting. The right to payment in
such situations is generally considered an expectancy not subject to
division as community property.90 Presumably, then, such expectancy is the separate property of the spouse "earning" it, and the tax
consequences attributable to property divisions will be determined
accordingly.
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX IMPLICATIONS
A. Gift Tax
In establishing alimony, dividing properties, etc., the parties must
be careful not to unintentionally effect a transfer which would fall
187.
188.
189.
190.
1966);
(1941).

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 72(m) and 402(a).
See Hughes, supra note 185, at 883.
Daigre v. Daigre, 228 La. 682, 83 So.2d 900 (1955).
Charles R. Wilkerson, 44 T.C. 718 (1965), aff'd per curiam 368 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.
W. E. Williams, 51 T.C. 346 (1968); French v. French, 17 Cal.2d 775, 112 P.2d 235
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within the purview of the gift tax.' 9 Under the general rule, property which is transferred for less than a full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth, is deemed to be a gift to the extent
of the excess of the value of the property transferred over the consideration received. 1 92 The relinquishment of marital rights is
generally not termed consideration in money or money's worth.' 9
If structured properly, however, a transfer between spouses will not
be subject to gift tax if it meets the requirements of one of several
exceptions discussed below.
Under section 2516,1 94 a transfer of property between spouses
incident to a divorce will be exempt from gift tax if: (1) the transfer
is made pursuant to a written agreement relative to the spouses'
marital and property rights; (2) a final divorce decree is entered
within two years after the date of the agreement; and (3) the transfer
is in settlement of the spouses' marital or property rights or provides
a reasonable allowance for the support of the spouses' children during minority. The agreement need not be incorporated in the decree
for this section to be operative.
If the decree is not entered prior to the due date for filing the gift
tax return for the calendar quarter in which the agreement becomes
effective (45 days subsequent to the end of the quarter), then a gift
tax return must be filed for such quarter and a copy of the agreement attached thereto.' 91 A certified copy of the decree must be
filed within 60 days after it is entered.' 96 The statute does not
specifically require the filing of a gift tax return when the statutory
requirements have been or will be met.
If the provisions of section 2516 are not met, the transferor can
rely upon the rule that the transfer of property under a property
settlement agreement incident to a divorce is a taxable gift only to
the extent that the value of the transferred property exceeds the
value of the support rights surrendered.' 9 7 This exception may have
limited application in New Mexico, since support rights ordinarily
involve alimony, which is only exceptionally awarded, and child
support.
A third exception providing relief from gift taxation requires that
191. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 2501-2524.
192. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512(b).
193. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1975).
194. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2516.
195. Treas. Reg. § 25.6019-3(b) (1975).
196. Id.
197. Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 414; Estate of H. B. Hundley, 52 T.C. 495
(1969),aff'dper curiam 435 F.2d 1311 (4th Cir. 1971).
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the transfer be made incident to a property settlement which is
either incorporated into the divorce decree or otherwise approved by
the divorce court, if the court has jurisdiction to order or modify
previously made property arrangements. 1 9 8
Ordinarily counsel should experience no difficulty in structuring
settlements within the framework of one of the exceptions. In most
cases, the decree should incorporate the property settlement and be
entered within two years following the date thereof, thus easily
averting gift tax by complying with section 2516.
B. Estate Tax
The estate tax problems stemming from divorce revolve around
the deduction for claims against the estate (alimony, child support,
etc.) and the exclusion of property transferred in conjunction with
the divorce settlement. Counsel should be aware of these potential
future tax pitfalls in arranging a present property settlement, lest the
client's estate be unduly burdened with unanticipated tax.
To be deductible from a decedent's gross estate, claims must represent personal obligations of the decedent and, to the extent founded
upon a promise or agreement, have been contracted bona fide and
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth.' 9 9 Thus, an obligation arising solely from a settlement agreement must be supported by bargained-for consideration, while one
founded upon a decree is deductible without such showing."' In
this regard, the commuted value of alimony payments, made pursuant to a property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce
decree, is deductible by the estate both for estate and income tax
purposes.2 01 Claims for the support of minor children are likewise
deductible when made pursuant to decree or agreement incorporated
in a decree. 2 02 The obligations to pay alimony or child support
must, of course, survive the decedent's death to give rise to a deductible claim.
Generally, obligations incurred for waiver of marital rights are not
supported by the consideration required by section 2053(c)
198. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); McMurtry v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d
659 (1st Cir. 1953).
199. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2053(c)(1)(A).
200. Rev. Rul. 60-160, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 374; Commissioner v. Estate of Watson, 216
F.2d 941 (2nd Cir. 1954), acquiescence 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 6. The divorce court, however,
must have jurisdiction to decree settlement rights or alter the terms of a prior settlement
agreement.
201. Rev. Rul. 67-304, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 224; Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929
(2nd Cir. 1946).
202. Commissioner v. Weiser, 113 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1940).
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(1)(A).3
As indicated previously, payments made pursuant to a
decree are not based upon promise or agreement and are deductible.2 04 Thus, an estate was entitled to deduct the proceeds from a
life insurance policy which a divorce decree ordered the decedent to
carry for his wife's benefit.' 0 The Court reasoned that it was unfair
to require inclusion of the proceeds, which would never accrue to the
estate's benefit, without permitting an offsetting deduction, and that
state law would require the estate to pay the ex-wife an equivalent
amount of the decedent had not maintained the policy. Likewise, an
estate was permitted a deduction for an amount willed to the
decedent's former spouse pursuant to a property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree.' 06 Crucial to both of these
decisions was the issuance of a mandatory decree by a court which
had jurisdiction to independently order such distributions or alter
previous agreements;2 0 by contrast a testamentary transfer to adult
children pursuant to a divorce decree was not deductible, where the
divorce court was determined to have no power to order transfers to
adult children. 2

08

Certain property transfers exist which, if made by a decedant
incident to a divorce, would be includible in the estate for tax purposes-a retained life estate, 2 09 a transfer making effect upon
death, 2 10 or retention of certain power over the corpus transferred. 1' These sections, however, specifically exclude transfers for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. Consequently, all property settlements which provide for property transfers to a spouse other than outright-equal community divisions
should be incorporated in the decree, which will operate to exclude
the transferred property from the decedent's estate.2 1 2

203. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2043(b).
204. Rev. Rul. 60-160, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 374.
205. Gray v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
13,019 (C.D. Cal. 1974). Contra, Rev.
Rul. 71-482, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 334; where the Service ruled that no obligation survived the
decedent's death, since the payment of premiums discharged his obligation. The rationale of
this ruling is questionable.
206. Florida National Bank and Trust Company at Miami v. United States, 182 F. Supp.
76 (S.D. Fla. 1960).
207. Rev. Rul. 60-160, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 374.
208. Estate of Harold Hartshorne, 48 T.C. 882 (1967), aff'd 402 F.2d 592 (2nd Cit.
1968).
209. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2036.
210. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2037.
211. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2038.
212. See, e.g., Estate of Hubert Keller, 44 T.C. 851 (1965); Estate of Morrison T. O'Nan,
47 T.C. 648 (1967), acquiescence, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 3 (including cases cited therein).
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CONCLUSION

Quite often, both parties may benefit from a properly structured
property settlement, since tax avoidance or reduction will provide a
larger estate overall to divide. The Internal Revenue Service is evervigilant, and is constantly increasing its audit expertise; yesterday's
settlements which escaped taxation may not fare quite as well today
or in the future. Consequently, the attorney who is unfamiliar with
tax matters should seek the assistance of tax accountants or other
attorneys who are well-versed in the area. At a minimum, the client's
regular tax counsel (accountant or attorney) should be consulted to
ensure tax-return compliance, maximum income tax savings, and
ascertainment of extent of community and separate property.
APPENDIX I-A

COMPUTATION OF GAIN IN UNEQUAL DIVISION
UNDER CROSS SALE THEORY
Husband and wife own the following community property:
Community
Basis
Item
$ 5,000
Cash & Savings Accounts
50,000
Listed Stocks
Cash Surrender Value
75,000
Life Insurance
125,000
Residence
200,000
Rental Properties*
Personalty
$465,000
TOTALS
The property is subject to the following liabilities:
Security
Item
CS Value
Insurance policy loans
Stocks
Margin account
Residence
Mortgage
Rental Property
Mortgage
--Note-Bank
TOTAL

FairMarket
Value
$ 5,000
75,000
75,000
200,000
275,000
10,000
$640,000

A mount
$ 65,000
20,000
25,000
130,000
10,000
$250,000

Pursuant to a settlement agreement, husband and wife divide the community on a fair
market value basis:
Wife
Husband
Cash & Savings Accounts
Listed stocks
Cash Surrender Value
Life Insurance
Residence
Rental Properties
Personalty
TOTALS

5,000

$
----

75,000
200,000
170,000
----

$450,000

$ 75,000

105,000
10,000
$190,000
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*Rental properties consist of the following:
Community
Item
Basis
Oak Street Building
$ 50,000
San Jacinto Land
105,000
32 Casa Grande North
35,000
Weed Farm
10,000
TOTALS
$200,000

FairMarket
Value
$ 65,000
125,000
40,000
45,000
$275,000

Mortgage
$ 30,000
75,000
25,000
$130,000

To equalize the division, husband agrees to assume all community debts, except on the
margin account and Oak Street property, which are to be assumed by wife. In addition,
husband agrees to pay wife $110,000 in cash over five years at 8% interest. The total settlement, then, appears as:
Item
Husband
Wife
Cash & Savings Accounts
Listed Stocks
Cash Surrender Value
Life Insurance
Residence
Rental Properties
Personalty
SUBTOTAL
Less Liabilities
Assigned
SUBTOTAL
Cash paid by husband to wife
to equalize division
NET DIVISION

$

5,000
-

--

$ 75,000

75,000
200,000
170,000
-_-_-_-_10,000
$450,000

$190,000

(200,000)
$250,000

(50,000)
$140,000

$250,000

110,000
$250,000

105,000

Under the cross sale theory, wife will be treated as having exchanged an interest in certain
community assets for an interest in other community assets. The gain on such exchange is
computed:
Property received in exchange for
community interest relinquished:
Cash received
$110,000
Debts assumed by husband
One-half of community debt
$125,000
Less one-half of community debt
assumed by wife on retained
properties
Oak Street property
(15,000)
Margin account
(10,000)
100,000
Additional community property
received by wife (one-half)
Listed stocks
37,500
Rental properties
52,500
Personalty
5,000
TOTAL RECEIVED
$305,000
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Basis of property transferred by wife to husband:
One-half community basis
Less one-half community basis
in assets retained:
Rental properties
Listed stocks
Personalty
Gain on property exchanged
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$232,500
(42,500)
(25,000)
(5,000)

160,000
$i45,000

Additionally, husband, pursuant to this approach, will also have entered into a taxable transaction. His gain is computed:
Property received in exchange for community
interest and separate property relinquished:
Community property received by husband
in addition to his one-half
$ 2,500
Cash & Savings Accounts
37,500
Cash Surrender Value-Life Insurance
100,000
Residence
$172,000
32,500
Rental Properties
Debts assumed (assigned) by
husband in addition to his
one-half
(10,000)
Margin account
32,500
Insurance Policy Loans
12,500
Residence Mortgage
5,000
Bank Note
75,000
35,000
Rental Properties Mortgage
$ 97,500
TOTAL RECEIVED
Basis of property transferred by husband to wife:
Cash
Basis in community assets transferred (one-half)
$ 25,000
Listed stocks
42,500
Rental Properties
5,000
Personalty
TOTAL BASIS
Loss on property exchanged

$110,000

72,500
$182,500
$ 85,000

Unless the particular community items transferred to wife have a substantially appreciated
value, the cross sale theory will generally reflect a loss to husband. (The deductibility of
such loss is discussed at Section IX-A.) Since husband is, in reality, purchasing a portion of
wife's community interest, this theory unjustifiably inflates wife's gain and manufactures a
loss for husband, which may or may not provide a tax benefit.
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APPENDIX I-B
COMPUTATION OF GAIN IN UNEQUAL DIVISION
UNDER INCREMENTAL THEORY
Husband and wife own the following community property:
Community
Item
Basis
Cash & Savings Accounts
Listed Stocks
Cash Surrender Value
of Life Insurance
Residence
Rental Properties*
Personalty
TOTALS

$

FairMarket
Value

5,000
50,000

$

75,000
125,000
200,000
10,000
$465,000

75,000
200,000
275,000
10,000
$640,000

The property is subject to the following liabilities:
Item
Security
Insurance Policy Loans
Loans
Mortgage
Mortgage
Note-Bank

5,000
75,000

Amount

CS Value
Stocks
Residence
Rental Property
----

TOTAL

$ 65,000
20,000
25,000
130,000
10,000

$250,000

Pursuant to a settlement agreement, husband and wife divide the community on a fair market value basis:
Husband
Wife
Cash & Savings Accounts
Listed Stocks
Cash Surrender ValueLife Insurance
Residence
Rental Properties
Personalty
TOTALS

$

5,000

$ --75,000

---

75,000
200,000
170,000

--

105,000
10,000
$190,000

--

$450,000

*Rental Properties consist of the following:
Item
Oak Street Building
San Jacinto Land
32 Casa Grande North
Weed Farm
TOTALS

Community
Basis

FairMarket
Value

$ 50,000
105,000
35,000
10,000
$200,000

$ 65,000
125,000
40,000
45,000
$275,000

Mortgage
$ 30,000
75,000
-

25,000
$130,000

To equalize the division, husband agrees to assume all community debts, except on the
margin account and Oak Street property, which are to be assumed by wife. In addition,
husband agrees to pay wife $110,000 in cash over five years at 8% interest. The total settlement, then, appears as:

NEW MEXICO LA WREVIEW
Item
Cash & Savings Accounts
Listed stocks
Cash Surrender Value
Life Insurance
Residence
Rental Properties
Personalty
SUBTOTAL
Less, Liabilities
Assigned
SUBTOTAL
Cash paid by husband to wife
to equalize division
NET DIVISION
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Wife

Husband
$

5,000

$
75,000

75,000
200,000
170,000
-_-_-_10,000
$450,000

$190,000

(200,000)
$250,000

(50,000)
$140,000

$250,000

110,000
$250,000

--

105,000

Under the incremental theory, wife will be treated as having disposed of a portion of her
share of the community. The gain on such disposition is computed:
Property received in exchange for
community interest relinquished:
$110,000
Cash received
Debts assumed by husband
$125,000
One-half of community debt
Less one-half of community debt
assumed by wife on retained
properties
(15,000)
Oak Street property
(10,000)
Margin account
$210,000
TOTAL RECEIVED
Basis of property transferred by wife to husband:
One-half of community basis
Less one-half of community basis
in assets retained:
Rental properties
Listed stocks
Personalty
Gain on property sold:

$232,500
(42,500)
(25,000)
5

160,00
$ 50,000

Under the incremental theory, husband, as the spouse who "purchased" the bulk of the
community, would recognize no gain.
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APPENDIX 11-A
COMPUTATION OF BASIS IN NONTAXABLE DIVISION
Based upon the community composition set forth in Appendix I-A, husband and wife enter
into the following settlement:
Husband
FairMarket
Community
Community
Fair Market
Basis
Value
Basis
Value
Item
Cash & Savings Accounts
Listed Stocks
Cash Surrender Value
Life Insurance
Residence
Rental Properties
Personalty
TOTALS

$ ---

$ ---

75,000
125,000

75,000
200,000

10,000
$210,000

10 000
$285,000

Liabilities Assumed:
Margin Account
Insurance Policy Loans
Mortgage- Residence
Mortgage-Rental
Properties
Bank Note

$

5,000
50,000

$

5,000
75,000

200,000

275,000

$255,000

$355,000
20,000

65,000
25,000

NET PROPERTY
RECEIVED

90,000

130,000
10,000
160,000

$195,000

$195,000

The basis of each spouse's property after the division under the aggregate-partnership and
Oliver theories is:
Wife
Husband
PartnershipPartnershipAggregate *
Oliver
Aggregate*
Item
Oliver
Cash & Savings Accounts
Listed Stocks
Cash Surrender Value
Life Insurance
Residence
Rental Properties
Personalty
TOTALS

$ ---

$ ---

61,184
163,158

75,000
125,000

8,158
$232,500

10,000
$210,000

$

5,000
48,750

$

5,000
50,000

178,750

200,000

$232,500

$255,000

*These amounts are determined by apportioning an equal total basis to each spouse and
allocating such basis to the assets based upon the respective fair market values. (Cash is
first assigned its face value.)
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APPENDIX II-B
COMPUTATION OF BASIS IN TAXABLE

DIVISION-PURCHASER
Based upon the property settlement set forth in Appendix I-A, husband and wife entered
into the following settlement:
Wife
Husband
FairMarket
Community
FairMarket
Community
Value
Basis
Value
Basis
Item
Cash & Savings Accounts
Listed Stocks
Cash Surrender Value
Life Insurance
Residence
Rental Properties
Personalty
TOTALS
Liabilities Assumed:
Margin Account
Insurance Policy Loans
Mortgage-Residence
Mortgage-Rental
Properties
Bank Note
Cash Paid
NET DIVISION

$

5,000

$

5,000

---

75,000
125,000
125,000
--

$330,000

75,000
200,000
170,000
--$450,000

65,000
25,000
100,000
10000-(200,000)
--$250,000

$ --50,000
--

$ --75,000
--

-

85,000
0
10,00
$145,000

105,000
000 0
$190,000
20,000
----

30,000
(50,000)
110,000
$250,000

Husband will be deemed to have paid $210,000 to wife for purchase of various community
assets:
$110,000
Cash
Liabilities assumed:
$125,000
One-half of community debt
Less one-half of community debt
assumed by wife on retained
properties
(15,000)
Oak Street
100,000
(10,000
Margin Account
$210,000
TOTAL PAID
The purchase price of $210,000 will be allocated to husband's assets after the division as
follows:
PurchasePrice
One-Half
Total
Allocated
Community Basis
Item
5,000
$
2,5001
$
2,500
$
Cash & Savings Accounts
Cash Surrender Value
75,000
37,500'
37,500
Life Insurance
133,108
70,6082
62,500
Residence
99,3922
62,500
Rental Properties
$375,000
$210,000
$165,000
TOTALS
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1. Cash and cash equivalents are allocated an amount sufficient to arrive at a total basis
determination equal to face value.
2. The remainder of the purchase price after allocation to cash and cash equivalents is
computed as follows:
Item
Cash
Cash Surrender Value
Life Insurance
Specific allocation of
mortgages to secured
property:
Residence
Rental Properties
Allocation of remainder
of purchase price
TOTALS

Cash and
Equivalents
$ 2,500

Residence

Rental
Properties
$

37,500

37,500

12,500
--$ 40,000

Total
2,500

58,108
$ 70,608

50,000

12,500
50,000

49,392
$ 99,392

107,500
$210,000

APPENDIX II-C
COMPUTATION OF BASIS IN TAXABLE DIVISION-SELLER
(INCREMENTAL APPROACH)
As illustrated in Appendix II-B, wife received the following in the property division:
Community
FairMarket
Item
Basis
Value
Liabiility
Cash
Listed Stocks
Rental Properties
Personalty
TOTALS

$

- -

50,000
85,000
10,000
$145,000

The basis in the properties after division is as follows:
Cash
Listed Stocks
Rental Properties
Personalty
TOTAL

$110,000
75,000
105,000
10,000
$300,000

$ --20,000
30,000
$ 50,000

$110,000
50,000
85,000
10,000
$255,000
Cash is valued at its face amount; the other assets will retain the basis to the community,
since they are in effect received pursuant to a nontaxable exchange.
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APPENDIX III
PRO-FORMA SCHEDULE ALLOCATION OF COMMUNITY
INCOME BETWEEN SPOUSES
R. V. Divorcee
Name and Address
123-45-6789
Identification Number

12-31-74
Taxable Year Ended

ALLOCATION OF COMMUNITY INCOME
Taxpayer, R. V. Divorcee and Ima Divorcee (I.D. 998-62-1111), were divorced on July 5,
1974. Schedules A through E of R. V. Divorcee's tax return includes community income
and deductions through July 5, 1974. Presented below is an allocation of such income to
the date of divorce.

One-Half
to R. V.
Divorcee
123-45-6789

R. V.
Divorcee
separate
income and
deductions
for
Entire Year

Total
amount
to
R. V. Divorcee

Community
income and
deductions
to 07.05-74

One-Half
to Ima
Divorcee
998-62-1111

Salary-XYZ Bank

$10,000

$ 5,000

$ 5,000

$10,000

$15,000

Dividends
Interest
Rental Income-Net
Capital Gains
TOTAL INCOME
Medical Insurance (1/2)

600
300
(1,000)
800
$10,700
60
$

300
150
(500)
400
$ 5,350
$
30

300
150
(500)
400
$ 5,350
$
30

450
100
1,500
100
$12,150
$ 120

750
250
1,000
500
$17,500
$ 150

1,500

750

750

3,500

4,250

800

400

400

100

500
3,000
100

Item

Taxes

Contributions
Interest
Miscellaneous
TOTAL
DEDUCTIONS
Withholding

2,000
200

1,000
100

1,000
100

2,000

$ 4,560
$ 2,000

$ 2,280
$ 1,000

$ 2,280
$ 1,000

$ 5,720
$ 2,000

$ 8,000
$ 3,000

Estimates
TOTALS

400
$ 2,400

200
$ 1,200

200
$ 1,200

500
$ 2,500

700
$ 3,700

---

